Abstract
Restructuring has been a usual clamor in a heterogeneous societies due to their nature. The study focusses on the challenges of Nigerian federalism and restructuring as a way out. It identified the factors necessitating the call for restructuring which are conceived as the challenges of the nation’s federalism. These are; elite interests, fear of domination, political idiosyncrasy among others. Devolution of power, review of revenue sharing, call for creation of states among others, were also identified as areas of contention in the struggle. The study adopted secondary method of data collection, and being a qualitative research, a descriptive analytical method was adopted. David Easton’s systems theory was adopted. The analytical discourse, revealed that, there are calls for restructuring from all quarters. The study concludes that, restructuring Nigeria is imperative, and that, it must carry every quarter alone with high degree of equity; for that is one of the most possible way by which cooperation and trust; which are paramount for institutional and organizational progress and development can be obtained. Organizing a Sovereign National Conference SNC as a platform for discussion, local government autonomy, review of revenue sharing pattern, creation of more states, and making Traditional Rulers more relevant in the governing process were recommended.

Keywords: Federalism, Devolution, Revenue Sharing, Resource Control and Restructuring

Introduction
Countries all over world adopt political arrangements that best suit their nature, context and composition. In some cases, such political arrangement facilitates a substantial amount of co-operation among the various segments and institutions all in a bid to achieve a better life for the citizens (Alsamee, Abdul-Wahab & Yusof, 2016). Federal system of government is one of such political systems mostly adopted in heterogeneous societies. This is why Nigeria operated a federal constitution which ensures that political, administrative and economic powers and functions are shared between the central government and its component units (Alsamee et al, 2016; Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa, Mathew & Akume, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji- Okoye, 2009).

Classical scholars see Nigeria’s federalism as a form of government where the component units of its political organization participate in sharing some powers and functions in a co-operative manner though the combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity among others that pull them apart (Tamuno,1983).

Earlier in the 19th century, the British had conquered the different parts of the then Nigeria at different times and established control and authority over them. These areas were grouped into Southern and Northern
protectorates. For the convenience of administration, the Northern and Southern protectorates were later amalgamated in 1914 by the colonial masters thus resulting into existence the country presently called Nigeria (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). However, as time went by, the British colonial rule, with its continued alienation and subjugation of the indigenous people, resulted into agitation for self-government. This further demonstrates that the political history of Nigeria was dominated by struggles for freedom especially between 1922 and 1959. In fact, it is now a common knowledge that some notable Nigerians: Sir Herbert Macaulay, Sir Abubakar T. Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and Chief Anthony Enahoro, to mention but a few, are regarded as the founding fathers of Nigeria’s nationalism (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009).

Given their struggles, the British colonialists gave concessions to Nigerian activists that led to the rise of the series of constitutions that came into existence, to assuage their feelings. The constitutions included the Clifford constitution of 1922; Richards constitutions of 1946; Macpherson constitution of 1951; and Lyttleton’s constitution of 1954 that gave birth to Nigeria’s federal arrangement. While the constitutions have played significant roles, historical, social, political and cultural factors also necessitated Nigeria’s adoption of federalism (Babalola, 2016; Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). These factors are diversities in nationalities, religions, cultures, resources, and fear of domination among the various entities.

In the light of the above, federalism is thus seen as a system that grant units’ considerable freedom and autonomy in the internal governance of their people given its centralized powers. As such, in a federal state like Nigeria, the constitution is supreme with shared powers between and among the three tiers of governments. Hence, in each tier, the government is expected to exercise certain control and function within its scope of authority.

Although, federalism has been practiced in Nigeria over the years, the agitation for restructuring to achieve resource control or what some scholars termed “true federalism” including secession is not a new phenomenon in the country’s political history. Hence, it is not surprising from recent issues; that there are agitations by certain component units of Nigeria. In fact, it is clear that some parts or indeed all parts of Nigeria are not comfortable and satisfied with the present federal arrangement. Mostly agreed is that the central and the other components of the federation of Nigeria heavily rely on revenue allocation from the federation account with greater percentage coming from the oil revenues (Agwanwo, 2014; Anugwam, 2005; Awofeso, 2017; Chijioke et al, 2012; Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 2015; Ojakorotu, 2008). Within the context of the political economy of oil in Nigeria’s federation, the question of control as some scholars termed it “resource control” (Babalola, 2016; Chijioke et al, 2012; Dickson & Asua, 2016; Madubuike, 2015) is not totally surprising.

Agbu (2004) had earlier maintained that agitations in Nigeria’s federal set up has fundamentally manifested itself over the quest for access and control over the political power to federally collect revenue. In addition, the rentier economic character of the Nigerian state is also a fundamental factor in understanding the dimension and interests of political forces in this struggle. Interestingly, the oil rent revenue constitutes a significant proportion of Nigeria’s national income (Agwanwo, 2014; Awofeso, 2017; Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 2015). More disturbingly is that, there has been a failure of governance at all levels of democratic governance structure mostly due to bad leadership and corruption over the years (Abbas, 2013; Anugwam, 2005).
In fact, most indicators of underdevelopment are still present in the country regardless of its varied geopolitical regions. It is thus pertinent to ask these questions: “what is wrong with Nigeria’s federal system? what are the problems as well as the prospects of restructuring in Nigerian Federation? To answer the questions posed by this paper, there is a need to find out the factors responsible for the current agitation that is posing threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria as well as the way out.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

**Federalism**

Federalism is a system of shared powers between units of government. It is a system of government that involves organizing a nation in such a way that two or more levels of government have formal authority over the same area and people (Ugwu, 1999). For the purpose of this discourse however, federalism is operationally seen as a political structure and/or system of government in which there is constitutional division and devolution of power to two or more levels of government which are often independent and co-ordinate in rank within a state (country). These levels of government are usually created along ethno-linguistic line to ensure active and efficient representation of all ethno-tribal and linguistic groups in governance.

**Restructuring**

To restructure is to change an existing status quo in order to make it more functional. It is the re-organization and re-arrangement of the nature of resource control by the various governments and to foster unity and development (Okonkwo, 2018 & Najakku, 2016).

**Theoretical Framework**

The study is theorized on the basis of systems theory which is one of the most suitable for studying a heterogeneous state, federation and/or a complex setting where both the political system and its system and sub-systems are inter-dependent on each other in terms of input, output/functions, and what affects one automatically affects the other (Kirchmair, 2017). The systems theory which is directly linked to the socio-political environment, as the constituents of humankind existence and survival (Stead & Stead, 2017).

In the systems theory, there are interactions, connectivity, and systematic processing of demands - input and output - policies) (Easton, 1957). Nigeria, being a British and heterogeneous making comprises of relatively independent, but interconnected and inter-dependent parts which altogether make up the federation in an arrangement (system) with inter-connectivity with environment, communication, transport, economy, religion, etc., all these are parts of operationalization of the systems theory (Baecker, 2017; Baraldi & Corsi, 2017).

The factors of ethnicity, religion, region and culture, all influence and shape the Nigerian system Crawford (1993). More so, Nigerian systemic structure is more properly studied and understood when its heterogeneities are taken into consideration in relation to the systematic formation of the federation itself (McCormick, 2010). The systems theory here becomes appropriate and relevant in the context of Nigeria being a federation with sub-systems/structures wishing to restructure the system. Restructuring the Nigerian system is an automatic reflection of the systems theorizations as the sub-systems are relatively interdependent on one another and an adjustment in one sub-systems affects the system. Restructuring Nigeria, therefore entails adjustments, repositioning, of the heterogeneous constituents which in turn has an overall effect on the Nigerian state system.
Factors Necessitating the call for Restructuring in Nigeria's Federation

Elite interest: This appears to be a major problem facing political restructuring of Nigeria. The politico-economic elites of the country who are being favoured in one way or the other by the existing political structure of Nigeria influence negatively the struggle for political restructuring. These set of people constitute the wealthy, the politicians and even some elected government officials. In the words of Ujah & Agbakwuru (2017), one of the reasons that the northerners shun the call for political restructuring is because of their landmass and population which grants the northern political elites the opportunity of being appointed in large numbers into government positions and using land to hustle for fund in Abuja. Also in the words of the former Governor of Akwa Ibom state, Obong Victor Attah as cited in Ujah & Agbakwuru (2017), “no governor today will lift a finger or put himself out to diversify or second restructuring when every month he can come to Abuja to collect his share of the booty. The only reason he would do so is if he knows that the survival of his state depends on it”. This out rightly shows that the call for restructuring has fallen to the dictates of the politico-economic elites of the Nigerian society. Thus, they become a strong challenger of the bid to restructure the pseudo-federalist political structure of Nigeria.

Fear of domination: This is another problem of restructuring in Nigeria. Ojukwu (1989) asserted that the problem with Nigeria is rooted in the fear of unity between the ethnic constituents of the country. This fear is predicated on the nature of allowing one ethnic group to dominate and is prevalent amongst the northern region of Nigeria. Sani cited in Nuhu (2016) stated that the north is opposed to restructuring because there is nothing to restructure. He argued that those who clamor for political restructuring or true federalism to enable each region and/or constituent unit to develop at its own pace are unwittingly advocating that Nigerians should leave as if they are in different countries, where some citizens would leave in comfort zones while others would live on the fringe. Also, in the words of Nwaorgu & Erondu (2010), an attempt to restructure Nigeria in 1966 and 1967 was battered by the northerners because of fear of domination of the southern region and the consequent was the genocidal war. From the above, the fear of having nothing and having the southern region dominate the northern has in a tremendous way inhibited political restructuring of the country as the northerners who are acclaimed the most populous would not consent for fear of a domineering uprising of the southern region.

Political idiosyncrasy: The political ideology of most of the politicians and citizens of Nigeria is one that is based on suboptimalism. By this, they are only concerned of their own self-interest and not concerned about the interest of all other people living within the diasporic federating units. Hence, their fight for or against restructuring will depend on how it will affect their self-interest even at the detriment of others. This political mindset makes some persons whose interest is neither within the politics of Nigeria nor its governance to remain apathetic towards the call for political restructuring despite their seeing the enormous decadence caused by pseudo-federalist practices within the country. This in all ramifications is an inhibition of restructuring because had these set of people been nationalistic and hold the interest of their country high, they would have added their effort for the call for restructuring and in no little way, the impact of their voice might foster the political restructuring of the Nigerian state.

Corruption: This is an anguis in herba – a snake conveniently hidden in the grassland of Nigeria social scene. The struggle for restructuring has seen shades of manifestation of corruption in
different dimensions. There are corrupt officials who are but political restructuring entrepreneurs using the call for political restructuring as a way to gain favour from the government or gain recognition or even paid. Once they achieve this, they end their call and move towards discouraging the call for political restructuring in Nigeria. Typical examples are in the cases of Asari Dokubo, Ralph Uwazurike and others who ended their struggle for restructuring of Nigeria when they gained recognition and favour from the government. This is an absolute inhibition of restructuring in Nigeria. Similarly, corruption has also manifested in the struggle for restructuring in the nature of presence of corrupt recidivistic politicos who having been in the position of government ab initio have also resorted to influence those in government now who are more like their godsons not to effect restructuring. A typical example is the case of Rtd. Gen. Yakubu Gowon firmly standing behind President Muhammadu Buhari on non-affection of restructuring in Nigeria. This is a strong challenge against the restructuring of Nigerian federation and one that need urgent attention (Egumjobi, 2016).

Fear of suppression: This is seen on the part of the citizens. The struggle for restructuring Nigerian federation is not meant only for the nationalist groups, the politicians, scholars and elites but for all the citizens. Observable is that one the reasons for the non-involvement of some citizens in the struggle for restructuring is the undemocratic use of military to suppress restructuring agitators. Lots of lives of those calling for the restructuring Nigerian federation have been lost in this form and most citizen dread of losing their own lives too. This fear of military suppression in a unidimensional way has adversely affected the call for restructuring of Nigerian state (Asua, 2016).

Citizenny laissez-faire attitude: This is another inhibitor of restructuring of Nigeria federation. The Nigerian citizens as a result of fear of suppression, ignorance, corrupt mindset and politicization exhibits lack lustrous and carefree attitude towards the struggle for political restructuring of the Nigerian federalism. This attitudinal deficiency is one of projectile factors that have necessitated the unrealization of the restructuring of Nigerian State.

The nature of the existing structure: The nature of the existing political structure of Nigeria is one that has an adversary effect on the restructuring struggle. This existing political structure is one that has a rigid constitution that makes it hard for restructuring to be effected. Similarly, the existing political structure of the Nigerian Federation allocated more land mass and population to the northern region of the country. This in all reasonableness is negatively affecting the political restructuring struggle as the higher population of the northern region makes it extremely difficult for the stance of the southern region on restructuring to be adopted; giving to the fact that northern region is comparatively favoured by the existing federalist political structure of Nigeria than the southern region (Tochukwu, 2002).

Weak institution: In the words of Ocholi (2009), “the government institutions who were strategic to the country’s pursuit of democratic ideas instead of serving as the bulwark of democracy, have become weakened by inefficiency, corruption, lack of commitment, incompetence, tribalism, hooliganisms and other sundry handicaps”. This weakness of government institutions is negatively felt on the political restructuring struggle of Nigerians. The government institutions who in the past have been assigned restructuring role had woefully failed in the performance of the assigned duty due to the weakness of the said institutions caused by the factors listed by Ocholi. An instance is the case of Revenue mobilization and fiscal allocation commission who was and still is charged with the
responsibility of structuring revenue allocation in such a way that will restructure the federal character of the country. Had they efficiently carried out their responsibilities, the ill-federalist revenue allocation problem trending in Nigeria today would have been a thing of the past. This shows the extent to which government institutional weakness has affected the political restructuring of the Nigerian state.

**Ethno-regional rivalry:** The issue of ethno-regional rivalry in Nigeria is an age-long one that till date is militating against restructuring of the Nigerian state. Following the rivalry among the ethno-regional nationalities in Nigeria emanating from development, resource concentration and resource allocation with a matching fear of domination, the ethno-regional bodies (especially the southern and northern region) have failed to come to agreement on restructuring. This is because they believe that restructuring would make one region more developed than the other and as such, the region that thinks that political restructuring might not fully favour them having conceived the other as a rival, tend not to agree to the adoption of political restructure as a way to eliminate the pseudo-federalist practices in Nigeria. This is solid wall on the way of political restructure which will be difficult to demolish (Agbu, 2004 & Egumjobi, 2016).

**The Agitations for Restructuring in Nigeria: Areas of Contentions**

Nigeria’s experience of federalism over years is characterized by and also dominated by the above intricacies as a solution to one problem leads to another and without a genuine desire to forge ahead. Hence, what are the areas of contentions or dissatisfactions that have over the years led to agitation for restructuring, by extension responsible for threatening the political stability of Nigeria in particular and its corporate existence in general?

There is common agreement among scholars that the exclusive legislative list of the federal government of Nigeria is too heavy. It is therefore argued that since the constitution grants more power to the Federal Government through the exclusive list such as the control of mineral resources in the country, the over centralization and concentration of powers at the centre is considered a dirge for the Nigerian federation (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-Okoye 2009; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).

The simple reason being one of the cardinal principles of federalism which is substantial autonomy is suffocated by this factor. It is interesting to note that majority of the state governments are calling for the reduction of items on the exclusive list and put them under the jurisdiction of the states (Alsamee et al, 2016). The main functions and responsibilities of resources allocation therefore lie with the central government. Hence, the distribution of power remains one of the hottest issues in the Nigeria’s federalism. More interestingly, because access to central political power in Nigeria is considered a license to be in charge of huge resource allocation (Abbas, 2013; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011), the controlling power continue to allocate a large percentage of such resources to its own advantage. In fact, these among other factors make leadership position at the centre very attractive and a do or die affair (Abbas, 2013; 2016). It should however not be forgotten that the principle of fiscal federalism requires that there must be sufficient resources to support both central and component units without which the federation cannot stand (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).

It is in this regard that Tochukwu (2002) submits that devolution of power with corresponding constitutional functions and
responsibilities to all the component units will reduce ethnic tension, unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation, low infrastructural development and the cry of marginalization in Nigeria. As earlier advanced by Alsamee et al. (2016), the devolution of power with defined duties and responsibilities to each federating authority will reduce the burden and expenses of the federal government hence allowing component units of the federation to determine the needs of its people and satisfy them easily through specialization.

**Review of Revenue Sharing Formula**

This is an aspect of intergovernmental fiscal relations that deals with constitutional power for a generation and sharing of revenue by different levels of government. Since early 2000 the vertical formula has been Federal Government (52.68%), State Governments (26.72%) and Local Governments (20.60%). While this has been practiced over the years, the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has not brought about the needed socioeconomic development as envisaged by the architects and advocates of the system. Most of the scholars identified such hindrances to the country’s dependence on oil revenue and its over concentration of economic resources at the federal level (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).

Specifically, Babalola (2016) advanced that if Nigeria’s current fiscal arrangement is to advance its constitutional economic objectives, this clear contradiction of over centralizing economic resources at the center must be addressed. Moreover, it is as result of this dominance of the federal government with regards to the proportion of revenue allocation to the center that agitation for a review of revenue sharing formula had continued unabated. Although Nigeria’s revenue allocation formula has over the years recorded changes but what seems unchanged is the allocation of lion share of centrally generated revenue to the federal government (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Ewetan, 2012). As explained earlier, the vertical allocation formula since 2000 has been in the favour of the federal government thereby ensuring what some scholars referred to as “federal dominance in fiscal matters” (Babalola, 2016).

For horizontal allocation, the 1999 constitution of Nigeria provides the principles of “population, derivation, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, needs and even development, etc” (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Ewetan, 2012). While there is common ground among the state governors that the higher proportion of revenue shall be allocated to the state government, there are concerns in the principle of derivation. Beyond the general principle of allocation, the Nigerian constitution provides no less than 13% of revenues generated from natural resource be allocated based on the principle of derivation. This means that since Nigeria’s revenue majorly depends on oil, the “oil producing states” are thus entitled to 13% derivation from the oil sales in addition to the statutory allocation from the federal government. While the derivation principle is captured in the constitution, its application has always raised eye brows and controversies among the elites of each region with a geopolitical dimension (Anugwam, 2005; Babalola, 2015; Chijioke et al, 2012; Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 2015; Ojakorotu, 2008). While the oil producing states continue to demand an increase in derivation from 13% to 50% (Madubuike, 2015; Ojakorotu, 2008; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015, Several National Political Reform Conference), other regions argue in favour of the advancement of the principle equality and population.

The main argument has been that since oil like other natural resources is a gift of nature, it therefore belongs to all Nigerians irrespective
of tribe or region (Babalola, 2016) that must not be exclusively allocated to a certain region or people.

Creation of More States

Since independence, Nigeria has witnessed numerous movements for state creation from all angles or regions in the polity. Generally, the main rationales behind the creation of states in Nigeria were to address various economic, political and socio-cultural issues in the country (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). In fact, it is based on this continues quest that, some groups are still calling for the creation of more states. It has been advanced that fiscal decentralization of public spending responsibilities in federal states brings about economic development (Alsamee et al, 2016; Babalola, 2016). At a variance with the federal government where the states are dependent on the all-powerful federal government, this has triggered a lot of robust agitation for the creation for more states in order to achieve massive devolution of powers to sub national levels. Scholars argued that true fiscal federalism has never been practiced in Nigeria in its real sense (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012). Therefore, in Nigeria “true federalism” was only practiced between 1954 and 1966, a period characterized by massive devolution of powers to the regions. It is on record that the period of military rule witnessed a reduction of power of the regions and subsequently more states and local government areas were over the years created as reflected in the constitutions (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009).

However, in spite of the series of structural changes that took place under the military regimes occasioned by agitations by several interest groups, the current number of states in Nigeria is considered by some interest groups as imbalanced. In terms of geo-political zones, North-West has (7 states), North- East (6states), North-Central (6 states), South-West (6states), South-South (6 states) and South East (5 states). Not minding the population, land size and other consideration fora such number of states in each geo political zones, what is regarded as imbalance have provoked serious agitations especially by the South-East and the Igbo communities in the country (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). Their argument has been that since every geo political region in Nigeria has at least 6 states, except the South East; there should be at least an equal proportion of such states. Such call for an equal proportion of states however does not consider other determinants for state creation especially population, land mass, etc.

Return to Regional Federalism and Parliamentary System of Government

Over the years, there have been calls to the return to federal structure based on the 6 geopolitical zones of the country as witnessed in the 1960s. Although Nigeria federalism and presidential system which started since 1979 has been operating, it has not been satisfactory to most of the stakeholders. While the changing forms and structures of the federation from 3 regional structure in 1960, 4 regions in 1963, 19 states in 1969, 23 states in 1987, 30 states in 1991 and, 36 states and Abuja (the FCT) and 774 local government councils in 1996 (Elekwa et al, 2011; Ezeji-Okoye, 2009), the fact still remains that most of them (states and local governments) were created along macro or micro-ethnic lines. Their consequence is that, the intra and interethnic discord which largely resulted from inequality of ethnic representation even in the 1960s is resurfacing at the state and local levels. In essence, current Nigeria’s federalism has only rotated between the factor of extreme regionalism that characterized the pre-independence and first republic era as well as the centrality of the military and to some extent the post military era. The wider implication is an enlargement of the federal government’s power even at the state and local levels. Hence,
the call for what was “better days” in the 1960’s that is the return to the former regional federalism and parliamentary system of government. Even more recently, some prominent leaders of the Yoruba nation (in a summit at Ibadan on 9/9/2017 have advocated for the return to regional government based on the 1960 and or 1963 constitution (TVC news, 2017).

In fact, some proponents of restructuring have argued that the current presidential system of government being practiced in Nigeria over the years is too costly and expensive to run in terms of financial management. Hence, the recent calls for the return to parliamentary system of government in order to reduce the cost of governance in the country are considered justifiable. The main argument being that under a parliamentary system, members of the parliament are members of the executive hence a possible reduction in the cost of governance. In furtherance of the saving cost argument, some proponents are even advocating for part time legislators instead of the permanent who in some cases are either idle or attending to unnecessary issues.

Reorganization of the Nigerian Police

Due to the upsurge in violent and non-violent cases of crimes and the inability of highly centralized police to prove it worth across Nigeria (Agwanwo, 2014; Egunjobi, 2016), there are calls from some quotas that the current Nigerian Police Force (NPF) be reorganized to face the current realities. These calls are not farfetched from the fact that there is a wave of recurring conflicts/insecurity such as insurgency, armed robbery, kidnapping, herdsmen/farmers clashes, among other insecurity challenges across the country that the NPF fails to address. Moreover, the failure of the current NPF to efficiently perform its constitutional duties, among other factors, is now blamed on the over-centralization of the force (Agwanwo, 2014; Egunjobi, 2016). To address this problem, two options remain the most common views. While some are calling for the decentralization of the current NPF through the establishment of state police, others are emphasizing the need for reform or reorganization of the force to serve Nigerians better. For the proponents of the establishment of state police, they argue that, it will help in curbing the current high rates of recurring criminal acts in the polity as it is expected to comprise officers who understand the language, geography and the peculiar security challenge of the people they would be policing (Agwanwo, 2014). To advance this particular argument, this view is worth sharing:

One argument for the establishment of state police is based on the need to reduce crime to its barest. Crime occurs in every “community” and is perpetrated by those who in most cases, come from that community or locality. To deal with crime therefore, there is an urgent need to ensure that “locals are absorbed and posted to their various localities to fish out the criminals (Agwanwo, 2014:170).

Beyond the argument for absorbing locals in addressing local security challenges, the call for state police will unravel the current “nominal role state governor’s play as the Chief Security Officer of their states” (Agwanwo, 2014:170). The argument has been that while the constitution stipulates that state governors are the Chief Security Officers of their respective states, in reality they lack such power to function. Instead, the Commissioners of Police who are appointed by the Inspector General of Police does such function. Furthermore, since Nigeria operates a federal system of government, it is argued that the roles and responsibilities of the protection of lives and properties of the citizens shall be decentralized like in other federal democracies such as in the USA (Agwanwo, 2014). It is advanced that such calls are for the “constitutional devolution of power to establish, organize, maintain and control the police by sub-national units making
up the Nigerian federation” (Egunjobi, 2016:1). Similarly, such creation of state police will reduce the current youth unemployment that in itself is considered a security threat to most communities and the nation in general. While the call for state police is considered advantageous by some quotas, these calls have also received criticisms championed by eminent Nigerians such as the former President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, current President Muhammadu Buhari, former Inspectors General of Police, Sunday Ehindero and Mohammed Abubakar, and the Northern Governors Forum, among other stakeholders (Agwanwo, 2014). Their fears may not be divorced from the experiences Nigerians have had during the era of Native Authority Police that operated under the then local government in the Western and Northern regions in the 1960s (Egunjobi, 2016). As reported by the scholars, while the idea of state police may be theoretically good, in this political environment in Nigeria, the fear is that the system may be abused by some sitting governments as was the case in the 1960s (Agwanwo, 2014; Egunjobi, 2016). The best option therefore according to this group is the advancement of the effective reformation of the current NPF to serve all Nigerian better. They further argued the multiplicity of state police formations with different state laws can be very difficult to manage especially in a complex country like Nigeria. Even more worrisome is that with many states of federation unable to pay their salaries for months, the funding of state police is unlikely.

Removal of Immunity Clause, Appropriate Role of Traditional Rulers and Recognition of Indigenous People

Section 308 (1-3) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) provides that no criminal or civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person holding the office of the President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor while in office. Some advocates of restructuring are calling for the removal or review of this section because it gives room for the abuse of entrusted power. The argument is that, this immunity clause had been abused by the holders of the key executive offices without due recourse to rule of law of the land and accountability to the people. While this position remains valid, there are fears that if this objective is attained most elected executive officials will be distracted from delivering their basic duties and responsibilities to the citizens. This means that, while the idea is considered a good one it should however be treated with caution especially by considering the current political environment in Nigeria characterized by lack of genuine opposition. In another case, the roles of traditional rulers in Nigeria are not constitutionally recognized with clearly defined roles or responsibilities. Hence, some individuals and groups are advocating for constitutional recognition of traditional rulers in Nigeria with clearly defined responsibilities not the current advisory roles in local decision making through Emirates and Kingdoms. Their main argument is that during precolonial, colonial and early post-independence era, traditional rulers were key players in the area of governance in various regions and capacities in the country. This was until 1976, when the then military government introduced a uniform local government administrative system in the country. Consequent upon this, traditional rulers were isolated from politics and formally assigned advisory roles which are not binding on the elected local government authority (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2009). This therefore means the return to status quo to pre 1976 where most traditional rulers in the country had constitutionally assigned roles and responsibilities.

In another respect, the indigenous people of Federal Capital Territory by the holders of the key executive offices without due recourse to rule of law of the land and accountability to the
people. While this position remains valid, there are fears that if this objective is attained most elected executive officials will be distracted from delivering their basic duties and responsibilities to the citizens. This means that, while the idea is considered a good one it should however be treated with caution especially by considering the current political environment in Nigeria, which is characterized by lack of genuine opposition. In another case, the roles of traditional rulers in Nigeria are not constitutionally recognized, with clearly defined roles or responsibilities.

Hence, some individuals and groups are advocating for constitutional recognition of traditional rulers in Nigeria with clearly defined responsibilities, not the current advisory roles in local decision making through Emirates and Kingdoms. Their main argument is that during precolonial, colonial and early post-independence era traditional rulers were key players in the area of governance in various regions and capacities in the country. This was until 1976, when the then military government introduced a uniform local government administrative system in the country. Consequent upon this, traditional rulers were insulated from politics and formally assigned advisory roles which are not binding on the elected local government authority (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2009). This therefore means the return to status quo to pre 1976 where most traditional rulers in the country had constitutionally assigned roles and responsibilities. In another respect, the indigenous people of Federal Capital Territory.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the issue of restructuring is largely becoming imperative. This is because, the factors responsible for the call is always getting more attention as well as having clear justifications. One of the cause of inefficiency in Nigeria is tied to inadequate collaboration and cooperation among Nigerians. Both in terms of governance and in the civil service and even in situations where the ordinary citizens are expected to cooperate and collaborate. However, the subject of restructuring must be in such a way that such regional, ethnic and religion differences will be eliminated. Therefore, the study concludes that, Nigeria must restructure, and the restructuring must carry all Nigerians alone with the highest sense of equity.

Recommendation
The general recommendation of this paper is that, agitations for restructuring should be considered by the government, and such shall be discussed and decisions to be reached on the platform of a Sovereign National Conference SNC and outcome should be duly implemented for such is the way out.

Specifically, the following are also tabled;

a. Local Government Autonomy should be granted fully, as well as review of revenue sharing formula.

b. More States should be created where necessary as some states have many different ethnicities and languages. These affect the level of unity, peace and stability in such a state because of high level of rivalry.

c. Some powers in the exclusive list should be removed as policing system has to be restructured to allow states have states’ police in order to ensure adequate policing at the community level.

d. Traditional Rulers should have more relevance (power) in the governing process in their respective domain. This is because, till date people use to have more respect and honor to traditional leaders than the politicians.

References


TVC news (2017, September, 9). Yoruba Nation Summit at Ibadan: Call for return to regional system of government of the first republic-1960 and 1963 constitution.