**TRENDS ON THE GLOBAL POWERS INFLUENCE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA SINCE 1991**

**SULAIMAN SHEHU**

**ABSTRACT**

*International politics is a domain and circle of many intricacies, interests and competition over diverse national interests by global powers. Africa has been drawn into the orbit of these dynamics due to several factors, particularly its abundant natural and human resources. Against this background, this paper examines the trends of global power influence in Africa using Russia as a case study. Russia has been steadily pursuing policies that are bringing African countries into its orbit of influence in order to reassert its position on Africa in international politics since 1991. Some tangible and intangible policies Russia is employing to have its footprint in Africa include diplomatic initiatives, economic partnerships, hosting African Summits, and military cooperation, as well as using its private military services to secure its interests in Africa. African countries are gradually falling into Russia’s national interests by accepting Russian military assistance and incredible participation in African-Russian Summits and many other things. Russia's approaches to Africa are driven by several dynamics, including geopolitical considerations, economic interests, and counterbalancing Western and Asian interests. This relationship has now taken a new dimension, which Russia is leveraging in international negotiations and decision-making in the United Nations General Assembly, particularly regarding voting sessions on resolutions. Russia is a significant player in the African continent, to the detriment of Western interests. Although this relationship with Russia started in the pre-colonial era, it is more pronounced in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This study used historical and exploratory research approaches to trace the Russian foreign policy in Africa and systematically explain it because it has yet to be done. This shows a wide gap in our understanding of Russia in Africa as a global power influence.*

**Keywords**: National interests, tangible and intangible policies, Soviet Union, PMC, Wagner.

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**Introduction**

Russia has been a noteworthy player in the African continent and has continuously been reasserting its position as a significant power in African international affairs. One of the critical elements of the Russian desire to reestablish itself as a significant player in the African continent is its longstanding relations with Africa. For over five centuries, mainly from the 17th Century to date, Russia has recognized the African continent as a great reservoir of natural resources, with a vast territory as well as a viable market for Russian goods that can be of benefit to Russia's national interests, especially in the year 2020, when Western countries were closing their doors to Russia because of its military ambitions in Crimea and Ukraine. On the other hand, African countries had recognized the momentous contributions the Russian Federation has made towards arresting the insecurity situation that debacle them at a time when the West was gradually drifting its support to the African continent since after the Cold War period. Russia, with its military capability inherited from the old Soviet Union and strong emerging economy, has been assisting the African continent immensely. Therefore, because of these and many other reasons, Russia and Africa had maintained their longstanding relationships dating back to Russia’s imperial past, especially during the Russian Empire under Peter the Great, the Tsar who opened Russia to the Western world and African continent as well as during the period of the Soviet Union.

**Background issues on African Relations with Russia (Soviet Union).**

Historically, Russian interest in Africa dates back to 1674 during the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov. Driven by security interests, Romanov sought an alliance with Ethiopia and Western Europe to forestall Turkish aggression. During the reign of Peter the Great around 1723, Russia succeeded when Peter the Great sent Admiral Golovin to Ethiopia to establish trade relations with Africans and extend an invitation to the Emperor of Ethiopia to visit Russia.

Unlike the other European nations that were busy partitioning the African continent into spheres of influence, Russia's interest at that period was centred on Ethiopia for security on the high sea and economic, religious, and political reasons. Also, the Tsars were interested in Egypt and southern African states, particularly around the Zanzibar area in the coastal town of Mombasa. In order to secure Russia's national interest and the support of African rulers, Peter the Great gave out gifts and lavish receptions. It sometimes used religious sentiments to manipulate his ways on the African rulers. The defunct Soviet Union used the same approach in Afro-Soviet relations. Russian Federation is following in the footsteps of the foreign policy approach employed during the Tsarist and Soviet Union regimes in Africa.

However, during the Soviet Union period, particularly in the Cold, the African continent became another area of international politics among superpowers. To this end, the Soviet Union became conspicuously involved in making the African continent politically aware of its independence and security landscape by granting financial and security assistance to many local Marxist, anti-colonial and anti-neo-imperialist groups for the second time. Also, during the Cold War, the Soviets supported and bankrolled independence movements and aided governments that faced internal or external crises after independence, such as Nigeria, Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Egypt, Zimbabwe and many others. Moscow delivered these countries' military hardware and advised them on the military-technical expertise. It also developed relations with various African intelligence communities, which led to longstanding relations.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, found itself in political and socio-economic disorder, especially from 1991 to 1999. Consequently, the Russian Federation retreated its steps and disengaged its activities from the African continent for a while to put its house in order. Also, the periods between 1991 and the early 2000s were characterized by Russian attempts to develop relations with Western countries while moving away from the African continent (Dmitri, T.; 2014). However, failing to achieve the desired thrust in its relations with the Western countries, the Russian Federation began developing a larger-scale, multidimensional strategic policy encompassing the former Soviet Union's geographical influence in the Middle East, Asia, China, Africa and Latin America. This multidimensional foreign policy and Russia's federation attempt to develop also failed at the early stage but were revived due to the economic and the Chechnya crisis that Russia faced during that period (Alcaro, R; 2015). President Vladimir Putin, in the mid-2000s, revived the multidimensional policy influenced by the rise of oil prices (Dmitri, T: 2014).

These developments made Russia refocus its attention on the African continent, which has left a lasting impression on its national interests and aspirations. By 2005, Russia had perceived Africa as a continent that could overcome Western domination and expand its sphere of influence. Russia hoped to gain international support and strengthen its position in world affairs by reestablishing relationships with African states. Economically, the Russian Federation views Africa as an essential partner in its grand strategy to have a market for its goods and services and a source of valuable natural resources such as metal, gold, diamonds and uranium, which are crucial for Russia's energy-dependent economy.

Therefore, by establishing economic cooperation with African countries, Russia hoped to achieve and secure these resources and diversify its trade relations since the Western bloc had blocked its market with sanctions. At the same time, China harboured in Asia, Africa, and America. These modifications in Russian foreign policy were felt in several countries and continents. For example, Russia is a member of the G-7 club, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Also, broke negotiation deals and established relations with the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) as observer status. It also ensures that relations with Far East China are kept intact by maintaining close relations with China, the prophesied superpower of the 21st Century. Added to these, the Russian Federation, by an act of commission, became a friendly nation with Turkey, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, and Egypt and revived to a lesser extent with Hamas, especially during the recent Palestine-Israel War in October 2023. Now, closely watching and observing with keen interest the happenings in Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba showed that Russian foreign policy-makers considered relations with Latin America very important (Lopatov, 2007).

Russian Federation's noticeable re-engagement with the African continent for the third time around the middle of the 2000s, especially in 2006, when President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of South Africa, followed by his successor President Dmitry Medvedev's journey to Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, and Namibia in 2009. Also, following Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow saw the need to double down its diplomatic relations with African countries to free itself from Western sanctions and to seek new strategic geopolitical partners and economic relations actively.

Therefore, from 2014 to date, Russian high-ranking officials, including foreign minister, security council secretary and deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov, have frequented different African states and signed multiple bilateral relations that include military, trade, investments and security cooperation agreements as well as written off billions of dollars debts. Russia's third return to the African continent has also concurred with a lukewarm attitude of America in the continent, especially during President Donald Trump's presidency, in which his administration scaled down USA counterterrorism efforts in the continent despite the growing insurgencies activities threatening many parts of the African continent. In addition, Moscow was strategically quick to fill the security gaps in Africa.

Hence, the main thrust of this paper is to examine the strategies and tactics the Russian Federation is employing in the African continent to gain the support and cooperation of African countries. Strategies include military assistance, economic aid, writing off debts, providing grains, political alliance, and organizing summits with African leaders. So far, topics of this nature have yet to be systematically thematically studied, thus creating a gap in our understanding of Russia's foreign policy in Africa, which the paper seeks to fill. However, before going into the subject matter, the study will briefly explore some strategies the defunct Soviet Union used in its African foreign policy.

However, communist ideology from the 1920s to the early 1950s had little impact on Africa due to the misapplication of the ideology by the proponents of the system and the impact that religion and Western countries had on Africans. However, by the 1960s to the 80s, the Soviet Union or communist presence in Africa had become impressively effective, with various strategies and tactics mainly prompted by establishing diplomatic, economic, and cultural missions on the African continent. Communist ideology succeeded in Africa because of several reasons. One of the desires of the Soviet Union to achieve its national interest policy in Africa was to export and foster Marx-Leninism ideology in Africa as well as to promote her influence as a superpower in the continent.

Another factor that made the Soviet Union focus on Africa in the late 1950s was the Sino-Soviet clash of ideas on implementing communism in Far East Asian countries that changed the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy in Africa (Danjo; 2003:19-20).

For these reasons and many others, the Soviet Union era was dominated by strategies for exporting communist ideas to Africa and the world. Nigeria, for example, was used by the Soviet Union as a launch pad to export communist ideology to other African countries because Nigeria was very vocal on issues against the continuous domination and colonization of other African states by Western imperialist states. This was the reason for Soviet interest in Nigeria during the Cold War period (Danjo; 2003:22).

Although the critical aspects of the Russian Federation's foreign policy remained verisimilitude to Tsar Peter, the Great of Russia, and the Soviet Union, they only differed on implementation techniques (Orumade; 2016). The critical verisimilitude of Russia's foreign policy from the 18th to the 21st centuries is expansionist interest, access to the warm water of oceans and seas, open windows to the West, and protection of her vast territorial integrity (Isolation).

One tactic is to introduce policies that would entice nations. Russian Federation used the same approaches and strategies as the Russian Tsar regime and the Soviet Union to court nations, such as by dishing out gifts and presenting them to nations or using religion or ideology as a common interest, idea of liberation or protective tendency, military-security assistance and economic relations. These are instruments used by the Soviet Union of yesterday and the Russia of today to draw nations into international relations (Danjo; 2003:22-23).

In addition, the Soviet Union used the opportunity of internal unrest in Africa to implant its footprint in Africa by playing a leading role in assisting African countries to overcome their problems. The Nigerian Civil War, from 1966 to 1970, marked a significant period where the relationship between the USSR and Nigeria was solidified. During the period when Britain, the primary source of Nigeria's arms supply, refused to supply offensive weapons to Nigeria on the pretext of humanitarian grounds and also France, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia as well as the United States followed Britain's footsteps in refusing to supply, Federal side weapons to prosecute war against Biafra (Dauda: 2006; Orumade;2016).

Therefore, Nigerians were in a difficult situation and turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. The situation created a diplomatic opportunity for the Soviet Union, which skillfully exploited the opportunity to the displeasure of the Western powers and acted in favour of the Federal government of Nigeria (Ofoegbu: 1980). The U.S. government was confident Britain would hold the Western line against Soviet Union penetration in Nigeria. Hence, it declared a formal arms embargo against both sides of the conflict.

Nigerian Missions went to Moscow, negotiated arms and cultural agreements, and by August 1968, Nigeria was able to secure two Czech Delpin L-29 jet fighters; four more followed later, and Kano airport was abruptly closed to civilian traffic, and Soviet Antonov freighters roared in with twenty crated MIG-15 fighters-trainers on board. Two hundred Soviet technicians arrived in Nigeria to assemble and test the aircraft. By the end of August, the jets were in the air, piloted by Egyptians – rocketing and introducing a new dimension into the war. From 1967 to 1977, Nigeria was very aloof toward the United States. In fact, because of this, the two countries took different positions over southern African liberation. Nigerians were angered by pro-Biafra propaganda in the United States and by America's refusal to sell arms to the federal side during the civil war. Whereas some Western world had supported Biafra, the A.U. sided with the federal government by voting for unity.

With this assistance, the Soviet Union initiated and introduced several programs and contacts with Nigeria in various forms ranging from cultural to economic and social, all helping to improve the political and diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries. For example, a three-person Soviet delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization visited Nigeria between December 10 and 23, 1968 (Alao: 2011). By the end of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria had become much wished in international politics, where there were no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests. On the other hand, the relationship with the Soviet Union led to an influx of Soviet diplomats and nationals doing business in the country.

Cheap Soviet-made automobiles such as Lada, Moskvitch and Volga became common on Nigerian roads, while other consumer items from behind the Iron Curtain also flooded the country's market. All the earlier restrictions placed on the movement and activities of Soviet personnel had been removed. The Soviets were awarded the contract to construct Nigeria's multi-million-dollar iron and steel industry in Ajaokuta, Kogi State (Fawole, 2003). This relationship progressed further not only with Nigeria but with the rest of African countries such as Guinea, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Zambia and Ethiopia. The Russian Federation, the inheritor of the Soviet Union, is taking African countries one by one to its fold in a piecemeal strategically designed, against the wishes of other international players in Africa, such as the United States of America, China and India. The question now is, what strategies and tactics are the Russian Federation employing to entice African countries? Some of the strategies and tactics employed by the Russian Federation are listed below.

**Diplomatic re-engagement through state visits strategy**

One of the strategies the Russian Federation used to woo the African States was the diplomatic efforts of re-engagement, which encompasses high-level visits to African countries as did during the Soviet Union era. For example, since 2014, various high-ranking Russian state officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, have frequented many African countries and signed various bilateral military, economic and security cooperation with African nations (Gavrilov; 2004). Also, it assures African governments that relations with Russia would be mutually beneficial for all. The same tactics were employed during the Nigerian Civil War, when the United States of America scaled down the importance of Nigeria in African relations (Emelyanov; 2000). Today, Russia utilized the lukewarm attitude of Trump’s administration towards the African continent and quickly filled the security gap in Africa (Ivanov; 2002).

**Russio-African economic and trade relations strategy**

Russia also used economic and trade relations to strengthen its diplomatic ties with African countries. Moscow can achieve this through expanding its economic strategy on trade with Africa. For example, revenue generated through trade between Africa and Russia had almost doubled from $9.9 billion in 2013 to $17.7 billion by 2012. Similarly, grain exports, as nearly 40 per cent of Africa's grain imports, come from Russia. Russia's giant trade partners are in North African regions such as Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, accounting for 67% of Russia's total trade volume. Russia's primary export commodities to North African countries are wheat, coal, refined petroleum, gas, and electronics, while in return, it imports fruits, sugar, and vegetables (World Bank, 2016).

Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal in 2023, which enabled Ukraine to export grain. This is now benefiting Russia's grain exports in disguise by cutting Kyiv out of the world market in Africa and increasing the dependence of many African states on Russian grains, such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia. President Putin of Russia asserted that his country is in the position of replacing Ukraine's grain on a commercial and gratuitous basis to Africa (Emelyanov, 2000).

Also, as part of economic and trade strategy outreach to Africa, Russia ensured that most of the companies that deal with Africa are either partially or wholly owned by the government, including oil and gas giants Rosneft, Tatneft and Gazprom, which carry out major hydrocarbon projects in North Africa. Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear power company, has also been actively engaged with different countries across the continent. For example, in 2022, it received permission from an Egyptian regulator to start building Egypt's nuclear power plant, based on the 2017 agreement signed between President Putin and President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt. The plant is expected to be fully completed by the year 2030. Rosatom also funds educational and cultural exchange opportunities in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics to support Moscow's African soft power efforts.

In addition to energy programs, Russia is also applying the strategy of cooperation with different African countries rich in natural resources, primarily diamond, gold, and uranium; for example, Alrosa, Russia's uppermost diamond mining company, was able to expand its operations in Angola, Congo and Zimbabwe. According to some African experts on international relations, Russia stresses collaboration over aid when seeking essential business opportunities in Africa, like the old Soviet Union, thus stressing the partnership of equals (World Bank, 2010).

**The Strategy of Defence and Security Cooperation.**

Russian Federation has also employed the strategy of defence and security cooperation with African countries as a way of enticing the Africans to press more for security cooperation with her by using the security and defence challenges facing African countries of rampant cases of religious- insurgencies, cattle rustling, kidnapping, weapons proliferation, insecurity and cross border criminal activities as a launching pad to secure a position (influential) in African affairs (Maslov; 2005). Although Moscow is still a tiny player in Africa, compared or measured by its economic and trade relations, her role waxes more robust and muscular daily, especially in defence and security ties with Africa in arms deals and joint military training exercises. Russia has succeeded as a significant arms supplier to Africa, accounting for about 40 to 50 per cent of Africa's imports of major weapons systems between 2018 and 2022 (Maslov, 2005).

Thus, the total arms imports from the USA are 16%, China 9.8%, and France 7.6% in 2018. Because of this diplomatic tie with Africa, according to a report by the Rand Corporation in 2020, Russian weapons sales to Africa have increased from around $500 million to over $2 billion annually in recent years. The key countries that import Russian weapons in Africa are Algeria and Egypt, which account for about 73% of Algeria's and 34% of Egypt's arms imports, respectively (World-Fact Book, 2016). The two countries have bought billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment from Russia since 2013, including the Su-30, Su-24, MiG-29 combat aircraft, and the S-300 missile, among others. Besides Algeria and Egypt, other countries that are slightly following them in Africa have engaged in receiving or ordering the supply of Russian weaponry, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, South Africa, Central Africa Republic, Angola and now the Niger Republics, which recently had a faceoff with its former colonial Master-France over the overthrown of the civil president by military juntas.

The reason why Russia is making its way into Africa and African leaders are swallowing Russia's pegs is because, unlike the United States of America and its allies, Moscow does not fix its arms deliveries attached to adherence to democratic principles or the protection of fundamental human right as America and western countries usually do. Due to this reason, Russia can send several armour, combat aircraft and missile systems to different war-torn –countries in Africa, including Libya, where it has supported eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar’s fighting against the Unrecognized government of the National Acc.

Also, Russia's modern weapons are usually cheaper than their Western counterparts and compatible with African terrain. Furthermore, another advantage Russia has over the West is that Russia has advanced military diplomacy in the continent by engaging different African nations in Moscow in military forums and exercises, including the International Army Games, which since 2015 has been attended by a dozen African countries, such as Angola, Algeria Congo, Mali and Zimbabwe.

This strategy also encourages the African states to sign military defence and security accords with Russia. Also, Russia organised annual naval friendship bridges and aerial defenders of friendship exercises between the Russian and Egyptian armies, supported by U.N. peacekeeping force operations in Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Western Sahara, and South Sudan. These are the kinds of opportunities the Russian Federation are utilizing to foster good military relations with Africa.

**Use of Private Military companies as a strategy**

Also, Russia is using the presence of its private military companies operating on the African continent to foster diplomatic ties and is a significant player in Africa. For example, unconfirmed sources reported that over seven Russian PMCs have carried out a minimum of 34 operations in 16 African countries from 2005 to date. These PMCs and their activities became more pronounced in mid-2014 to date when Russia occupied Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in the Syrian war in 2015, both of which enabled Russia to advertise and offer its PMCs services as private security guards and military training as well as conducting combatant services to different governments and separatist militant groups across Africa. Reports indicate that Russian PMCs have a substantial presence in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan.

The presence is also registered in Congo, Gabon, Libya, Mali, Madagascar, Burkina Faso and now Niger Republic. Today in Africa, they are the central gun runners in the region, especially in the south of Sahara West Africa, which is causing a significant proliferation of arms, banditry, insurgencies, kidnapping, cattle rustling and religious disharmony such as Boko haram. This may be connected with their strong ties with Moscow and African countries or warlords. Russia Federation is using or trading Private Military companies as a strategy to secure economic concession and mineral resources endowed in fragile countries like Libya, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria (Orumade, 2016).

**The Strategy of Debt Relief**

As part of ongoing strategic efforts by Russia to ensure that it becomes one of the major players in Africa, Russia has written off most of the debt owed by some African countries. This gesture by Moscow had earned her the cooperation and trust of African countries, especially in international politics. For example, in the United Nations General Assembly, Russia enjoyed the support and backing of many African countries regarding critical issues on the United Nations floor, such as resolutions and vote proceedings, which were indebted to her favours. A case in point was the 2014 General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea and the 2018 resolution urging Moscow to demilitarize the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which are part of Russian National interests (Solodovnikov, V. G.; 2000).

Many African nations decline to vote or participate in the Assembly process on these resolutions. The same thing happened in the 2022 resolution decrying Russia's attempt annexation and occupation of four Ukrainian districts. Indeed, in all the four resolutions mentioned above, a sizeable number of African states voted against the proposed resolutions. Some abstained or did not attend the voting session, directly or indirectly supporting Moscow's efforts at challenging the United States of America and its allies within the international frameworks in the United Nations General Assembly (Wilk, A. et al.; 2012).

All this support Russia is enjoying from African nations was because of the written off of debt and other diplomatic incentives Russia introduced as a diplomatic strategy towards African countries, which are now abandoning their traditional ally - America and its allies and tilted towards Russia for military and security assistance that American and its allies failed to provide for them in their quest to ensure the security of their countries and continues to engrain themselves in power.

**Strategy for Organizing Russian-African Summit**

Another strategy Russia uses to push for closer ties with Africa and to be a major player in Africa is the Russo-African Summit, which has now become a religious summit in Russia. Strategically, Russia is using the Summit with African leaders and high-level official Africans to push for more diplomatic relations in the continent (Deich & Polikanov, 2003). For example, in 2019, President Putin hosted the first-ever Russia-African Summit, in which issues relating to Africa were discussed, and some solutions were proffered, promising to assist African countries in overcoming their security and economic challenges. He also assured African leaders and heads of state that Russia' is a reliable strategic companion partner in the continent. With this assures strategy from Moscow, Russia was able to secure military contracts with some African countries worth millions of dollars, including Nigeria, which agreed to purchase Russian attacker helicopters (Deich; 2007).

Also, in the 2023 Summit, despite the sanctions imposed on Russia by the Western bloc because of the Ukraine –Russia war, about 17 Head of state of African countries with high-level government officials attended the Summit in which several accords and agreements were signed, ranging from military, and security, grain supply, and prevention of arms race on space as well as combating terrorism and promising to write off additional debts (Dmitri; 2014).

**Strategy of renewing efforts in the energy sector.**

In its bid to have closer relations with African nations and become a major player on the continent, Russia Federation did not restrict itself only to the strategy of hosting summits, diplomatic efforts, or the use of Private military services called Wagner. Wagner also supports and assists African nations in the energy sector in swallowing their pegs (European Commission, 2012).

Notable among Russia's efforts to push for closer ties with African states is the thrust for nuclear energy to meet the African energy needs. Western countries were late to appreciate the importance of Nuclear energy diplomatic efforts; although countries like France knew the importance of this aspect, her role in Africa was to control the sale and supply of uranium, not to help the Africans in energy self-reliance as Russia is doing now in Africa (European Commission, 2012). To this end, Russia has redoubled its efforts in this direction as a critical parameter of strategic competition on the continent. Engaging in energy diplomacy is also central to countering the widespread narrative that Western countries are only interested in plundering the continent's mineral resources for their prosperity without assisting the Africans.

**Conclusion**

Many considerations and dynamics of international politics and domestic interests drive the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards the African continent. The grand strategy of Russian foreign policy is to become a world superpower. Some of the factors that gave rise to Russia's seeking closer ties with African countries include the United States of America and its Western ally’s denial of Russia's access to the West to preserve their centuries-long dominance in global affairs. Also, apart from geopolitical considerations and historical ties, Russia seeks to strengthen its economic cooperation, counterbalance America and its Western ally's influence in Africa and revive historical relationships with African nations. While Russia's engagement in Africa is still relatively modest compared to other global powers, its efforts should be considered part of a grand strategy to assert itself as a significant player on the international stage. By leveraging its military capabilities, energy resources and diplomatic initiatives, Russia aims to regain its influence on the global stage.

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